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PRIVACY PARADOX 2.0
H. Brian Holland*
As a starting point, this essay offers six basic propositions.
First, "the 'privacy paradox' " refers to inconsistencies "between
individuals' [asserted] intentions to disclose personal information
and [individuals'] actual ... disclosure behaviors."' Put simply, we
indicate-at a granular level-specific items of personal information
that we will not disclose, but we then give away that same data
with what appears to be little regard for the risks of doing so and
for little in return.2 Second, the privacy paradox is a well-
established concept in many fields of the social sciences, even
though the precise contours and causes of the paradox are quite
controversial.3 Third, broadly speaking, legal scholarship has failed
to adequately consider either the various conceptions of the
privacy paradox set forth in other fields of scholarship or the
import of these conceptions to what may be intended or perceived
as more normative legal works.4 Fourth, this failure creates a
" Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law; J.D.,
American University Washington College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University
School of Law; Doctoral Candidate (mass communications, digital media),
Pennsylvania State University.
1 Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information
Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100, 100 (2007).
This definition does not invoke concepts of "willingness" or "knowledge," or a
more amorphous conception of "privacy attitudes." See id. at 100-03. This
approach seeks to avoid, at least for the moment, the more protracted causation
argument that has dominated and obscured the descriptive statement of
condition, for example, that there is an inconsistency between assertion and
behavior. See id
21d,
3 See, e.g., Julia Lane, Administrative Transaction Data 12 (German
Council for Soc. & Econ. Data, Working Paper No. 52, 2009) (discussing the
relationship between ethics and privacy issues).
4 This broad statement is, of course, subject to notable exceptions. See
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 58-61, 125-26 (2010). See generally James
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009) (discussing how
social networking sites are socially compelling, yet harmful to privacy interests).
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significant gap in what might be termed relevance, credibility, or
practical effect, marginalizing the impact of legal scholarship in
the formation of privacy policy. Fifth, this space in the sphere of
influence elevates the role of fields that are traditionally less
concerned with the core privacy values of personhood, autonomy,
and control-inter alia, economics, contract law, marketing theory,
and computer science.5 Sixth, the emergence of social network
sites both alters the conditions of the privacy paradox and
intensifies the rate and depth of uncontrolled disclosure, further
marginalizing legal scholarship that fails to seriously consider the
role of the law in privacy policy.
6
Focusing on this final point, the goal of this essay is to
describe both the current market in personal information and the
privacy paradox as a product of market distortion. Part I identifies
two unique phenomena that modify the conditions of the privacy
paradox by creating new and powerful distortions in the market,
thereby intensifying the rate and depth of personal data disclosure.
The first is a transformation in social organization, which drives
individuals to join social network sites and to disclose a great deal
of personal information on those networks. The second is an
alteration of the basic structure of the information exchange
agreement that permits social networking sites to recede into the
background as third-party beneficiaries to the social exchange of
personal information. Part II addresses the necessity to account for
the effect of these phenomena in the formation of privacy policies
by briefly addressing various proposals for regulating the
collection, storage, use, and transfer of personal information. This
section argues that many of these proposals are misguided, either
because they under-protect personal information by failing to
adequately address the problems of valuation and consent or
because they overprotect personal information by failing to
5 See, e.g., PROTECT The Privacy Paradox, AM. LIST COUNS. (Am. List
Counsel), Winter 2007, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.alc.com/newsletters/
ALCnewsletterW07.pdf (providing an example of how marketing theory is
impacted by privacy paradox inconsistencies).
6 danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210,




adequately preserve functionality in socially valuable
communications platforms. Part III attempts to briefly
conceptualize the broad outline of a more workable solution that,
rather than reforming the current notice-and-choice system of
privacy protection, is guided by user expectations in imposing
minimal restraints on the margins of data collection, storage, use,
and transfer practices. Although a solution would impose certain
boundaries on the scope of consent, significant space would remain
for the negotiation and development of social norms around
privacy practices.
I. "MARKETS" IN PERSONAL INFORMATION AND SELF-REGULATION
Personal information is produced through a continual process
of action and observation as an "unavoidable byproduct of human
existence. 0' In a culture of pervasive surveillance, always-on
observation produces a vast amount of indiscriminate personal
information. s Once produced by this interplay between action and
observation, personal information becomes available for collection,
storage, use, and transfer as a valuable commodity. 9 Conceived in
this manner, as the output of the interactive process between two
parties (the actor and the observer), it is perhaps unsurprising that
traditional economists invoke familiar market models to explain
personal information collection l ° as what might be described as a
7 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Toward a Political Economy of Personal
Information, 10 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 70, 76 (1993).
8 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontierfor Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 201-08 (1992).
9 Craig D. Tindall, Argus Rules: The Commercialization of Personal
Information, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 181, 182-87.
10 See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 393-
409 (1978) [hereinafter Posner, Right] (comparing and contrasting economic and
noneconomic theories of privacy). Posner laid substantial groundwork for this
approach, applying economic analysis to the dissemination and withholding of
personal information. See id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 405 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Economics]; see
also Kai-Lung Hui & I.P.L. Png, The Economics of Privacy, in 1 HANDBOOKS
IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS: ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 471, 473,
475-76 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006) (citing Posner, Economics, supra;
Posner, Right, supra; George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics
2010]
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hybrid of rights creation in the data collector and rights transfer to
the data collector."
Because of this somewhat unusual hybrid, the market in
personal information is defined by secrecy and consent rather than
by an exchange of property. 12 Individuals hold no property rights
in their personal information.' 3 Rather, individuals control their
rights in that data only to the extent that they are able to conceal or
manage its disclosure, 14 just as the information seeker may use
reasonable means to collect personal data outside of the consent
market. 15 Once disclosed, property rights in that information are
and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980)) (explaining that Professor Posner
and others in "[t]he 'Chicago School' ... contended that regulation is not
needed-markets for personal information would work as well as markets for
conventional goods and services").
" Vera Bergelson, It's Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 440 (2003).
12 See Posner, Right, supra note 10, at 393 (citing Judith Jarvis Thomson,
The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975)). Posner focused his
analysis on information that is private in the sense that its subject "will incur
costs to conceal [it]." Id. at 394. If that same information has "value to others[,]
... others will incur costs to discover it. Thus we have two economic goods,
'privacy' and 'prying.' " Id. Posner explained that these are "intermediate rather
than final goods ... [in that] people are assumed not to desire or value privacy
or prying in themselves but to use these goods as inputs into the production of
income or some other broad measure of utility or welfare." Id. Thus prying and
the personal information that such prying reveals is valuable not as an exercise
in itself, but if it "enables one to form a more accurate picture of a friend or
colleague, and the knowledge gained is useful in one's social or professional
dealings with him." Id. at 395. Access to this information can thus bring
efficiency to the market. See id. at 398-99 & n.15. Conversely, the ability to
conceal and control the flow of information about oneself reduces the efficiency
of the markets and creates the opportunity for misrepresentation or fraud for the
purposes of exploitation. Id. at 399.
13 See generally Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in
INTERNET POLICY AND ECONOMIC: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES (2009),
available at www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy_rpt.htm (discussing how
property rights could be defined in terms of an individual's personal
information). But see Posner, Right, supra note 10, at 397 (implying that
property rights have yet to be assigned).
14 See Posner, Right, supra note 10, at 399-400.
15 See, e.g., id. at 395. An individual might take steps to conceal the private
information, but others may well "have a legitimate interest in unmasking the
deception." See id. Here, Posner allows that certain intrusive means of obtaining
896 [Vol. 19
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not, strictly speaking, transferred to the observer, but are instead
created in the receiving institution that collects it. 16 Indeed, the
data subject has no property rights to transfer.17 Yet by establishing
a property right with the data collector, the information is
converted into a valuable asset to be used internally and/or resold
on a third-party secondary market.' 
8
Characterizing the consensual decision to disclose personal
information to a third party as a market transaction creates
analogous contract questions. 19 To the extent, however, that these
exchanges are inherently contractual, it is only for the revelation
itself and not as an agreement to transfer property-like rights in the
information. 20 In adopting a system of secrecy-based rights of
disclosure and consent, the data subject's ability to bargain with a
particular information seeker is limited to the initial transaction.
2 1
The data subject has essentially two options: complete the
transaction (disclose) or not (conceal).22 Of course, data gatherers
personal information (for example, eavesdropping) may be regulated, but only
because of increased costs resulting from less effective communication. See id.
at 395, 401; see also Hui & Png, supra note 10, at 474, 475 ("The Chicago
School supports free collection and use of information; hence the issue of
property rights is moot.").
16 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1996, at
92, 93, 96 (citing SEC'YS ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 7-10 (1973) [hereinafter RECORDS & RIGHTS]).
17 See id. (citing RECORDS & RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 7-10).
18 See, e.g., id. (citing RECORDS & RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 7-10)
(discussing the value of personal information, using credit card companies as an
example).
19 See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1426, 1444 (1982).
20 See id; Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in
Information and Information Systems, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 235, 250 (2003)
(citing STEPHEN ELIAS, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK: A DESK
REFERENCE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 66 (Lisa Goldoftas ed., 1941);
John R. Dean, The Sheriff is Coming to Cyberville: Trademark and Copyright
Law and the Internet, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 96 (1997)).
21 See Vickery, supra note 19, at 1444-45.
22 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 2055, 2077 (2004) (asserting that one failure of the current privacy market
is that it "leav[es] consumers with a binary, all-or-nothing choice to permit or
prohibit collection of their personal data").
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may create more explicit contractual exchanges by voluntarily
adopting terms of use and privacy policies that bind not only the
data subject, but also the data collector.23 If they do, the parties
must then, by law, "abide by that policy. ''24 There is, however, no
obligation to adopt such a policy, and in most cases, there are no
externally imposed, applicable minimum standards of privacy
protection.25
Under the current market model, regulation of routine online
interactions is de minimus. 26 The unauthorized acquisition or
transfer of personal information might trigger liability rules
23 Allyson W. Haynes, Web Site Visitors and Online Privacy: What Have
you Agreed to Share?, S.C. L., July 2008, at 27, 28 (citing Privacy Policy -
About AOL, http://about.aol.com/aolnetwork/aol-pp (last visited May 14,
2010); Terms of Use - About AOL, http://about.aol.com/aolnetwork/
aolcom terms (last visited May 14, 2010)).
24 See id. at 29 (citations omitted) (discussing various federal and state
privacy laws implicated by a stated privacy policy). Privacy policies and terms
of use have, in some cases, been found to create a basis for contract, tort, or
statutory liability. See, e.g., Doe v. Network Solutions, LLC, No. C 07-05115
JSW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7397, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that
companies may incorporate their privacy policies into the service agreement by
reference, thus creating a contractual duty to abide by those policies); Columbia
Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46364, at *36-38 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (treating a privacy policy as if it were a
contractual creation of a duty); Collegenet, Inc. v. Xap Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1079 (D. Or. 2006) (citing Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2000); McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991)) (stating that a
privacy policy may give rise to a tort claim where the privacy policy has "a
tendency to deceive" customers); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) (explaining that a privacy policy could be construed
as a unilateral contract "if the privacy policy was sufficiently definite and the
Plaintiffs . .. read [and relied on] the policy prior to providing personal
information").
25 Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition
Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 1, 13-14 (2008) (citing Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The
Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of Personally Identifying Information,
10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 597-98 (2008)).
26 See Peng Hwa Ang, The Role of Self-Regulation of Privacy and the




embodied in certain privacy torts,2 7 but these liability rules have
28generally proven ineffective in practice. Likewise, the acquisition
of a particular type of information or of information concerning
certain vulnerable groups (such as young children) may fall within
statutory or administrative regulations.29 However, the vast
majority of online interactions involving the disclosure of personal
information fall outside this narrow band of restriction.3" This
leaves industry self-regulation, such as voluntary privacy seals and
privacy policies, as the primary limitation on the activity of data
gatherers, yet often with inadequate results. 31 Privacy seals can
actually be quite misleading to the average consumer, indicating
nothing more than the mere existence of a privacy policy-without
regard to its content or its effectiveness.3 Likewise, behavioral
studies have shown that the mere existence of a privacy policy
tends to increase information disclosure, without regard to whether
the user reads that policy or understands the actual content.33 Not
27 See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 11, at 406-14 (discussing various
privacy torts, including intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of
embarrassing facts, and appropriation of name or likeness); Posner, Right, supra
note 10, at 409-21 (discussing how tort law is connected to an economist view to
privacy). But see Bergelson, supra note 11, at 405 (rejecting the fourth privacy
tort, "false light," as inapplicable).
28 Bergelson, supra note 11, at 405 ("All three theories ... have been tested
and rejected by courts in [the torts] context.").
29 See Ang, supra note 26, at 3, 6 (citing Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006); Driver's Privacy Protection Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006)); see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1-.12 (2009).
30 See Ilene R. Berson, Grooming Cybervictims: The Psychological Effects
of Online Exploitation for Youth, 2 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 9, 9-10 (2003), available
at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/-john/NetSafe/I.Berson.pdf.
31 Ang, supra note 26, at 3, 5-6.
32 See generally Kai-Lung Hui et al., The Value of Privacy Assurance: An
Exploratory Field Experiment, MGMT. INFO. Sys. Q., Mar. 2007, at 19, 19
(reporting the results of a Singapore experiment assessing "privacy statements
and privacy seals"); Robert LaRose & Nora Rifon, Your Privacy is Assured--of
Being Invaded Web Sites with and Without Privacy Seals, IADIS INT'L CONF.
E-SOCIETY, 2003, at 63, 65, 69-70, available at www.iadis.net/dl/finaluploads/
200301L009.pdf (discussing how privacy seals have generally been an
ineffective method of protecting personal privacy).
33 See Janice Tsai et al., What's it to You? A Survey of Online Privacy




surprisingly, a 2006 study examining the privacy policies of
Fortune 500 company websites found that "[I]ess than 4%
complied with all measured aspects of the [Fair Information
Practices (FIP)]," which are guidelines for notice, choice, access,
integrity, and enforcement regulated by the Fair Trade
Commission (FTC).34
II. DEFENDING THE CURRENT MARKET
Traditional arguments over the privacy paradox-defined as
inconsistencies between "individuals' [asserted] intentions to
disclose personal information and their actual personal information
disclosure behaviors"35-presume a concept of a "market" in
personal information and have thus centered on market function.36
The predominant view in traditional economic studies of
privacy implicitly rejects the idea of significant distortion in the
market model of secrecy and consent and, thus, the existence of a
significant privacy paradox within this market model.37 As active
and willing participants in the market for personal information,
consumers are seen as rational economic agents "who are [either]
fully informed or [who] base their decisions on probabilities
coming from known random distributions. '" 38 Consumers not only
"have the right to manage privacy trade-offs without regulative
intervention, but ... individuals can, in fact, use that right in their
34 Kathy Stewart Schwaig et al., Compliance to the Fair Information
Practices: How are the Fortune 500 Handling Online Privacy Disclosures?, 43
INFO. & MGMT. 805, 808, 809 tbl.4 (2006).
35 Norberg et al., supra note 1, at 100.
36 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy
Behavior: Losses, Gains, and Hyperbolic Discounting, in ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION SECURITY 165, 166 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004).
" Id. at 166-68.
38 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in
Individual Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, 2005, at 26, 26
[hereinafter Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality]; see also
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of
Immediate Gratification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON




own best interest. 3 9 Although individuals are concerned about
privacy, that concern "is not absolute., 40 Consumers "are willing to
[knowingly] trade off privacy concerns for economic benefits.'
1
In some cases, private information is consciously exchanged for
"convenience," "personalization, 4 2 or merely the ability "to use a
web site."43 Simply put, traditional economists often argue that the
market is working and that consumers are receiving appropriate
value for the disclosure of their personal information."
Accordingly, any apparent deviation between professed attitudes
about privacy in personal information and actual behavior in the
handling of that personal information is understood to be illusory;
overstated; or, in fact, optimal.45
This portrait of consumer participation allows researchers to
argue that perhaps the privacy debate is "misdirected. 4 6 The issue
should not focus on regulating the "collection and use" of personal
information, but rather "in setting the right 'prices' " for that
exchange.47 Moreover, "surveys and experiments clearly show that
people value privacy ... less than some privacy advocates have
claimed. 4 8 For example, Bernardo A. Huberman, Eytan Adar, and
Leslie R. Fine conclude that the privacy paradox is explained, at
39 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26.
40 I1-Hom Hann et al., Online Information Privacy. Measuring the Cost-
Benefit Trade-Off, in TWENTY-THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1, 8 (2002), available at http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/
-ipng/research/privacyicis.pdf.
41 id.
42 Ramnath K. Chellappa & Raymond G. Sin, Personalization Versus
Privacy: An Empirical Examination of the Online Consumer's Dilemma, 6 INFO.
TECH. & MGMT. 181, 184-86 (2005).
43 Hui & Png, supra note 10, at 489-90.
44 See id. at 473-75 (citing Posner, Economics, supra note 10; Posner,
Right, supra note 10; Stigler, supra note 10).
45 See, e.g., Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 406 ("[T]here seems to be
no solid basis for questioning the competence of individuals to attach
appropriate ... weight to private information-at least if 'appropriate' is equated
with 'efficient.' ").
46 Hui & Png, supra note 10, at 491.
47 Id. at 491-92.
48 Id. at 490.
2010]
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least in part, by the "strongly contextual nature" of disclosure.49
Essentially, people demand a greater price for disclosing
information that they perceive to be less desirable and a lower
price when they perceive that information to be "somewhat typical
or positively atypical compared to the target group. 50 Moreover
"small deviations in a socially positive direction are associated
with a lower asking price."5' Based on these findings, Huberman,
Adar, and Fine suggest that reported privacy attitudes reflect
concern over the potential disclosure of "less desirable"
information, while permissive privacy behaviors largely reflect the
low cost disclosure of information that is perceived to be socially
52neutral or socially positive.
III. THE PRIVACY PARADOX AS MARKET "FAILURE"
Working within the market conception, commentators have
offered at least three primary critiques of rights, structure, function,
and efficiency: behavioral market distortions, the decline of
consent contracting, and the data subject's lack of legal control
over its personal information.
53
A. Critique Number One: Behavioral Market Distortions
Some behavioral economists are openly skeptical of these
attempts to explain away the privacy paradox as efficient or
illusory. 54 Pointing to a variety of distortions in the market, these
skeptics question the evocation of a "fully rational view of the
economic agent. 5 5 Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, for
example, point to three factors hindering the decision-making
49 Bernardo A. Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy, IEEE SECURITY &
PRIVACY, 2005, at 22, 25.
50 d. at 22.
51 Id.
52 id.
53 Hui & Png, supra note 10, at 472; Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23-24;
Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 32.
54 See Hui & Png, supra note 10, at 473-74; Acquisti, supra note 38, at 21-
22; Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26.
55 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 22; see also Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy
and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26.
902 [Vol. 19
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process with regard to privacy and disclosure: "incomplete [and/or
asymmetric] information, bounded rationality, and systemic
psychological deviations from rationality." 56 These factors, they
conclude, "suggest that the assumption of perfect rationality might
not adequately capture the nuances of an individual's privacy-
sensitive behavior." 57 Such distortions may, in some measure, help
to explain the apparent paradox between privacy attitudes and
observed behaviors.
In the context of online transactions and privacy, the data
subject may possess incomplete information on several levels.58
For instance, even when directly involved in the transaction, the
subject may lack full awareness of the nature and existence of the
privacy invasion itself.59 This is even more likely where third
parties provide information regarding the data subject to a data
gatherer "without [the subject] being part of the transaction
between those parties." 60 Even where the data subjects are directly
involved, they may not be aware of the risks associated with data
disclosure, the probability of such detrimental occurrences, or the
benefits of protecting one's 6rivacy, as many of these risks are only
perceptible after the fact. Likewise, in weighing the costs of
protection, the data subject may lack complete information
regarding the alternatives or the ease and availability of "protective
technologies., 62 Asymmetric information, sometimes referred to as
a " 'lemons market,' "63 is a species of incomplete information, in
56 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26
(citing Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23-24); see also Schwartz, supra note 22, at
2079-84 (citations omitted) (describing the failure of the current market as a
problem of, inter alia, "information asymmetries" and "'bounded rationality' ").
57 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26
(citing Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23-24).
58 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23.
'9 See id.
60 See id. (citing George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)); Acquisti &
Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26 (citing Varian, supra
note 13).
61 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23.
62 Id.
63 Tony Vila et al., Why We Can't be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies:
Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, in ECONOMICS OF
2010]
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which facts material to the decision-making process-for example,
how disclosed personal information will be used by the data
gatherer-are known to one of the parties but not the other.14 This
skews the market.6 5  The company that gathers personal
information "know[s] a good deal more about how it uses the
personal information it collects than [the data subject knows]. '66
As Paul Sholtz has observed, "[flor most people, it is difficult
enough just to find and understand a company's privacy policy,
much less to monitor the company's use of personal information
and detect when violations have occurred., 67 The data gatherer is
thus able to internalize the benefits of personal data while
externalizing most of the costs.
68
The concept of "bounded rationality" refers to "our inability to
acquire, memorize, and process" information that is relevant to the
decision-making process. 69  Acquisti offers the following
description:
INFORMATION SECURITY 143, 145 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004)
(citing Akerlof, supra note 60); see also Schwartz, supra note 22, at 2081 &
n.134 (quoting Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1993))
(describing how an imbalance of information results in a "lemons equilibrium,
which occurs when the market offers only bad products for sale or presents only
bad contract terms").
64 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26
(citing Varian, supra note 13).
65 Craswell, supra note 63, at 49 (citing Akerlof, supra note 60; Michael
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44
REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977)).
66 Paul Sholtz, Transaction Costs and the Social Costs of Online Privacy,
FIRST MONDAY, May 2001, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/859/768 (citing Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-
Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal
Information, in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997), www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/
selfregl.htm).
67 Id. (citing Swire, supra note 66).
68 Id. (citing Swire, supra note 66).
69 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 27
(quoting 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 291 (1997)).
904 [Vol. 19
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In [the privacy] context, bounded rationality refers to the
inability to calculate and compare the magnitudes of payoffs
associated with various strategies the individual may choose in
privacy-sensitive situations. It also refers to the inability to
process all the stochastic [(non-determinative)] information
related to risks and probabilities of events leading to privacy
costs and benefits.
70
Some behavioral economists claim that bounded rationality creates
distortion in the current market for personal information because
"the agent is assumed to have both rationality and unbounded
'computational' power to process ... all information in their hands
and [to] draw accurate conclusions from it." 71 Even the most
privacy-concerned individuals are not informed and cannot inform
themselves about privacy risks, even when that information is
available, because they simply cannot process that amount of
72information. Instead, individuals resort to "simplified mental
models, approximate strategies, and heuristics" 73 (such as
intuition), an educated guess, or common sense.
Acquisti and Grossklag's third noted condition, "psychological
deviations," refers to a collection of factors. 74 For example,
"hyperbolic discounting" describes how an individual's " 'relative
preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date gets
stronger as the earlier date gets closer.' "75 There is an interplay,
moreover, between hyperbolic discounting and individual
tendencies toward "immediate gratification" and "self-control
bias," as a lack of self-discipline impedes the individual's ability to
act concretely in pursuit of longer-term, overarching desires.76 One
result is the propensity "to underinsure oneself against certain
70 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 23.
71 Id. at 24 (quoting 3 SIMON, supra note 69, at 291-93).
72 Acquisti & Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality, supra note 38, at 26-27
(citing 3 SIMON, supra note 69, at 291).
73 Id. at 27.
74 Id.
75 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 24 (quoting Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew
Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, 125 (2001)).76Id. (quoting O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 75, at 125-26).
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risks. ' 77 To explain, "people may genuinely want to protect
themselves, but because of self-control bias, they will not actually
take those steps, and [will] opt for immediate gratification
instead. 7 8 This cost-benefit analysis is further complicated by
difficulties in risk comprehension.7 9 One such difficulty is
"optimism bias," the belief that our own risks are less than those of
similarly situated individuals. 80 Likewise, we tend to operate with
limited "foresight perspective," focusing on immediately
perceptible risks and benefits rather than the less obvious or
forward-looking risks and benefits. 81 Finally, it is difficult for
individuals to recognize the cumulative risks associated with
information disclosure, and as a result, individuals often fail to
include these costs in the decision-making calculus.
82
Taken together, these market distortions are said to explain, at
least to a significant extent, the apparent paradox between privacy
attitudes and observed behavior. 83 Risk perception, although
perhaps heightened in the abstraction of a survey study, is distorted
in the actual moment of decision because individuals tend to adopt
a rather myopic view of privacy.84 The benefits of information
disclosure are accentuated and the perception of the immediate,
future, and cumulative risks of disclosure are mitigated. 85 Even
77 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 24 (citing Howard Kunreuther, Causes of
Underinsurance Against Natural Disasters, 9 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
206 (1984), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/2004_Gen
Papers HKUnderinsurance.pdf).
78 Id. (citing George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting
Future Utility 2 (U.C. Berkeley Econ., Working Paper No. EOO-284, 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=239901).79 Id. (citing Paul Slovic, What Does It Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk?
Adolescents' Perceptions of Short-Term and Long-Term Consequences of
Smoking, 13 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 259 (2000)).
80 Id. (citing Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks,
246 SCIENCE 1232 (1989)).
81 Id. (citing Philippe Jehiel & Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and
Stopping Tomorrow: Limited Foresight Perspective (CESifo, Working Paper
No. 2603, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=1 379442).
82 Id. (citing Slovic, supra note 79).
83 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 24.
8Id. at 24-25, 27.
85 See id. at 22, 26.
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sophisticated individuals concerned about privacy and aware of
risks are unlikely to act as rational economic agents under these
circumstances, even when they perceive the risks of disclosure to
be significant. 86 As Acquisti observes, the persistence of the
privacy paradox in these extreme cases tends to indicate that
industry self-regulation and user self-protection schemes will not
be sufficient to protect individual privacy. 87 Likewise, generalized
efforts to increase awareness are unlikely to have a meaningful
effect on the decision-making process.
88
B. Critique Number Two: The Decline of Consent Contracting
As previously described, if one characterizes the consensual
decision to disclose personal information to a third party as a
market transaction89-regardless of the species of rights held,
created, or transferred-this exchange creates analog questions of
fair and effective contracting. 90 The classic notion of contracting is
of consensual, bargained-for, individualized agreements to which
the consumer knowingly and voluntarily assents. 91 A second
critique of the market in personal information posits that online
contracting generally, and contracts for the disclosure of personal
information specifically, are overwhelmingly standardized and
nonnegotiable. 92 Consumers must either accept the terms as
dictated by the provider or go elsewhere.93 The result is little or no
86 Acquisti, supra note 38, at 27.
87 id.
88 id.
89 See Laudon, supra note 16, at 96, 99.
90 Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of
Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1573
(2006); see also Laudon, supra note 16, at 99.
91 RICHARD W. BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE
OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 89-90 (2002); Laudon, supra note 16, at 99.
92 See generally Barnes, supra note 90 (proposing that those who consent
to the terms of Internet spyware contracts fall victim to an unequal bargaining
process that violates public policy and often produces contracts that are
unconscionable).
93 Id. at 1608 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
2010] 907
WIDENER LAW JOURNAL
bargaining power.94 Indeed, consent itself is similarly obscured.95
In some situations, the provider masks contract terms in an attempt
to dramatically decrease the transaction costs associated with
reading, understanding, and renegotiating the contract. 96 In other
cases, the consumer is presented with what might be characterized
as a sophisticated form of adhesion contract, such as click-through
or shrink-wrap 'agreements.' 97 In either situation, the idea that the
consumer has consented in any real sense is largely fiction.
98
This move toward standardized contracts has caused some to
question "the continu[ing] legitimacy of contract models based
upon volitional bargaining and individualized assent to contract
terms." 99 Most consumers no longer bother to read or understand
contract terms, perhaps because they know that renegotiation is not
possible. 00 The value of standardized and nonnegotiable contracts
to the provider, particularly in reduced transaction costs, is simply
too great given the disparities in bargaining power.' 0' Moreover,
courts seem unwilling to apply the traditional contractual standards
and remedies of unconscionability, fraud, duress, etc., to reign in
these practices.'°2
94 Barnes, supra note 90; Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors
for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 69, 112-13 (2006).
" Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
96 See Barnes, supra note 90, at 1608 (citations omitted).
97 Id.
98 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
99 Barnhizer, supra note 94, at 80 & n.54 (quoting and citing Margaret Jane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1998); Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 431, 485 (2002)) (explaining the concept that
" 'there can be no free-standing purely 'private' regime of property and contract' "
should apply to cyberspace). Margaret Jane Radin and R. Polk Wagner argued
that the statement should apply to cyberspace. Radin & Wagner, supra, at 1295-
96.
100 Barnhizer, supra note 94, at 112-13.
101 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1224 (1983).
102 See, e.g., Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984). But see Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa.
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Pushing standardization to an extreme, some have adopted a
'contract-as-product' " model, conceptualizing contracts as
component commodities. °3 The terms of the transaction are
considered to be part of the purchase, just "one more characteristic
of the good or service being sold."'10 4 Proponents of this approach
argue that, as commodities, contracts may actually be subject to
greater regulation through safety standards, warranties, labeling
requirements, and the like.10 5 It is clear, however, that the
commodification of contracts would signal the end of the
traditional notion of contracts based on individualized bargain and
consent. Thus commoditized personal information would be
integrated with commoditized terms of transfer.
Absent individualized bargaining or real consent, it might be
argued that there can be no market efficiency or even no market at
all.
C. Critique Number Three: Lack of Legal Control over Data
A third critique of the market in personal information attacks
our conception of the character of the goods of exchange. As
previously described, the data subject has no property rights in his
Super. Ct. 1991) (citing Koval v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 487, 491 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987); Bishop, 480 A.2d at 1094).
103 Barnhizer, supra note 94, at 81 (citing Michael J. Madison, Rights of
Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REv. 433, 441-42, 446-52
(2003) [hereinafter Madison, Rights of Access]; Michael J. Madison,
Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 315-16 (2003)
[hereinafter Madison, Reconstructuring]; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 99,
at 429-31; Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of
Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1125, 1139-40 (2002); John J. A.
Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 285, 286-88, 308-10 (2000); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203,
1203-07 (2003); Rakoff, supra note 101, at 1176-80).
104 Id. (citing Madison, Rights of Access, supra note 103, at 441-42, 446-
52; Madison, Reconstructuring, supra note 103, at 315-16; Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 99, at 429-3 1; Radin, supra note 103, at 1139-40; Burke,
supra note 103, at 286-88, 308-10; Korobkin, supra note 103, at 1203-07;
Rakoff, supra note 101, at 1176-80).
105 Id. at 81-82 (citing Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U.
L. REv. 131, 149-50 (1970); Radin, supra note 103, at 1139).
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or her personal information.'0 6 The individual's rights are instead
defined by his or her ability to conceal or manage the disclosure of
that information.'0 7 Property rights arise only upon disclosure, and
then only in the data collector.' 0 8 It is argued that this is an
intractable problem with the market: a problem beyond distortion
that cannot be reformed but necessitates a wholesale redefinition of
the market itself.10 9 The starting point for this approach is a rather
minimal statement about markets:
as long as the two parties involved can readily make and
enforce contracts in their mutual interest, the marketplace itself
will arrive at the most efficient resolution of the problem. All
that is required is a clear definition of who has the legal right
... (in other words, property rights) and the marketplace will
take care of the rest.'1°
A consistent idea emerges from this proposition: it is possible to
construct a more efficient market through the recognition of some
species of property rights in personal information where those
rights are allocated to the data subject rather than to the data
gatherer.11" ' Although the specifics vary, advocates of this approach
generally see three advantages in allocating property rights to the
data subject: (1) it will bring data subjects more clearly into the
market for personal data, "encourag[ing] participation in the
information economy;"' 12 (2) it will provide data subjects with
106 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 Sholtz, supra note 66.
110 Id. (citing David Friedman, The Swedes Get It Right, WORLD
ACCORDING TO COASE, http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Coase_
World.html (last visited May 14, 2010)).
111 Id.
112 Id. Interestingly, Marco De Boni and Martyn Prigmore reach the same
result through the application of Hegelian principles of alienation, concluding
that this analysis "provides a clear allocation of economic rights: to the
individual to whom the information pertains." Marco De Boni & Martyn
Prigmore, A Hegelian Basis for Information Privacy as an Economic Right,
LEEDS METROPOLITAN U. SCH. COMPUTING, http://www.lmu.ac.uk/ies/comp/
staff/deboni/papers/Hegelian_ Basis For E-privacy.pdf (last visited May 14,
2010) [hereinafter De Boni & Prigmore, Hegelian Basis]; see also Marco De
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more control over their personal information and, thus, increased
bargaining power in negotiating its transfer, resulting in a more
functional and efficient market and forcing data gatherers to
internalize certain costs that they are currently able to
externalize;" 13 and (3) it will provide individuals with a greater
ability to effectuate what is perceived to be an individual
preference for greater privacy, with an accompanying social
benefit. 14  Without property rights, the data subject lacks the
bargaining power necessary for a fair and efficient market and the
ability to control downstream rights.' 15 Various critiques of
propertization are addressed later in the essay.
116
IV. SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND MARKET DISTORTIONS
This essay's primary assertion is that the emergence of social
network sites modifies the conditions of the privacy paradox by
creating new and powerful market distortions that intensify the rate
and depth of personal data disclosure. These distortions are
founded on two integrated phenomena. First, social network sites
are uniquely situated to benefit from certain transformations in
social organization that are driving individuals to (1) join these
mediated networks and (2) disclose a great deal of personal
Boni & Martyn Prigmore, A Hegelian Basis for Privacy as an Economic Right,
3 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 168, 184 (2004) [hereinafter De Boni & Prigmore,
Privacy as an Economic Right]; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual
Property?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (2000) (citing Laudon, supra note 16,
at 92-100; Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, US
Government Information Policy 29-30 (July 30, 1997), http://citeseerx.ist.
psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.64. 3289&rep=rep l &type=pdf).
[Editors' Note: The above citation references two similar, but nonetheless
distinct, versions of the Marco De Boni and Martyn Prigmore article. De Boni &
Prigmore, Hegelian Basis, supra; De Boni & Prigmore, Privacy as an Economic
Right, supra.]
113 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 112, at 1130-46 (discussing the appeal
and limits of a property right in personal information); Sholtz, supra note 66
("[I]t is clear that a significant market failure has occurred concerning ways in
which companies collect and use personal information.").
114 See Sholtz, supra note 66.
115id
116 See infra pt. V.
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information via those networks. 1 7 Second, social network sites are
altering the basic structure of the information exchange agreement,
such that awareness of and consent to personal information
collection and associated practices recede even more deeply into
the background." 1
8
A. Phenomenon Number One: Transformations in Social
Organization Driving Data Disclosure
Sociologist Barry Wellman described the evolution of social
organization "[firom [l]ittle [b]oxes to [s]ocial [n]etworks," 119
mapping this transition to a tripartite typology of movement from
bounded groups to glocalized relationships and now towards
networked individualism. 120Glocalization describes a shift away
from neighborhoods (bounded groups) to households and
worksites (glocalized relationships),12 1 resulting in a "combination
117 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see infra pt. IV.A.
lS For a discussion of the second phenomenon, see infra pt. IV.B.
'19 Barry Wellman, Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked
Individualism, in DIGITAL CITIES II: COMPUTATIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACHES 10, 10-12 (Makoto Tanabe et al. eds., 2002), available at
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-wellman!publications/littleboxes/littlebox.PDF
[hereinafter Wellman, Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked
Individualism]. Wellman has observed that, strictly speaking, "a group is really a
special form of a social network that is densely knit... and tightly bounded," but
that the distinction is helpful to the analysis. Barry Wellman, From Little Boxes
to Loosely Bounded Networks: The Privatization and Domestication of
Community, in SOCIOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONTINUITIES
AND CUTTING EDGES 94, 95 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1999), available at
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-wellman!publications/littleboxes 1/littleboxes 1.
pdf [hereinafter Wellman, From Little Boxes to Loosely Bounded Networks].
120 Wellman, Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked Individualism,
supra note 119, at 10, 12, 16 (describing a community of networked
individualism where "[p]eople remain connected, but as individuals rather than
being rooted in the home bases of work unit and household"); see also Barry
Wellman, The Rise (and Possible Fall) of Networked Individualism, 24 INSNA
- CONNECTIONS, 2001, at 30, 30, available at http://www.insna.org/
PDF/Connections/v24/2001 I-3-4.pdf (describing the evolution of community
towards " 'networked individualism,' in which the individual operator of his/her
network is important, rather than the household or work unit").
121 Wellman, Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked Individualism,
supra note 119, at 13.
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of intense local and extensive global interaction" 122 based on
"shared interest rather than ... shared kinship or locality. '" 123 This
transition from groups to glocalization was "driven by
revolutionary developments in both transportation and
communication," facilitating movement away "from hierarchically
arranged, densely knit, bounded groups" in single locales to
"contact between people in different places and multiple social
networks. '" 124 The rise of networked individualism refers to a
second transition from place-to-place connectivity to person-to-
person connectivity and the technologies that make that transition
possible by "linking people wherever they are." 125 Cellphones,
e-mail, instant messaging, and the World Wide Web allow people
to remain connected across larger, but fragmented, networks-
moving rapidly between them, "but as individuals rather than being
rooted in the home bases of work unit and household."
126
A recent "Social Ties" study by the Pew Research Center
found support for Wellman's theory in empirical data.
127
Researchers concluded that "social relationships-and
communit[ies]-are not fading away" or falling apart;
communities are simply transforming.' The traditional
orientation toward neighborhood-based or other single-community
groups is being replaced by spatially dispersed social networks.
129
With kinship and friendship unhinged from location, 130 social
networks are more fragmented, but they are also robust.13' They
122 Wellman, Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked Individualism,
supra note 119, at 13.
123 Id
124 Jd. at 10, 13.
1
25 Id. at 15.
126Id. at 15-16.
127 See JEFFREY BOASE ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE
STRENGTH OF INTERNET TIES: THE INTERNET AND EMAIL AID USERS IN
MAINTAINING THEIR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PROVIDE PATHWAYS TO HELP
WHEN PEOPLE FACE BIG DECISIONS 42 (2006), available at
http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media/Files/Reports/20O6/PIP_Internetties.pdf.
pdf.






are broad, in that the average social network comprises more than
two hundred relationships,' 32 but they are also deep, including a
sizable number of friends and relatives who are much more than
mere acquaintances. 133
The Pew study also found many benefits of these larger, more
fragmented social networks.' 34  They tend to expand the
individual's exposure to the diverse experiences of others. 135 They
are likely to provide better access to specialized resources. 136 There
is also a greater potential for the provision of social capital.
37
Even within these larger networks, core ties-people with whom the
individual has a very close relationship-play a distinct role,
providing a more frequent source of help with significant life
issues and events.' 38 What makes these new social networks
distinctly different, however, is the sheer number and expanded
role of significant ties' 39-people outside the individual's ring of
core ties, but more than mere acquaintances. 14 These significant
ties play a more important role at the margins, providing assistance
with somewhat less significant matters, such as searching for a
new job, finding a place to live, choosing an item to purchase, or
making an investment. 14 1 Thus individuals with larger social
networks, usually including a greater number of significant ties,
"seem to get the best of both worlds."' 142 They maintain both a rich
pool of core ties, from whom they are able to draw social capital in
times of great need, and a large and diverse network of significant
ties, from whom they are able to receive more specialized
resources. 143






136 See id. at 26-28.
137 Id. at 15.
138 BOASE ET AL., supra note 127, at iii, 30 & fig.12.
31Id at 29-30 & fig.l 11.
140 Id. at iii.
141 Id. at 30.
142Id. at 29-30.
143 Id. at 29-30 & fig.12.
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These expansive social "networks can also be a burden."'
144
The desire to build large social networks-and the effort expended
to do so-lead almost inevitably to a desire to ensure their
maintenance over time and distance.' 45  The growth and
fragmentation of one's social networks comes not primarily from
exposure to vast numbers of potential social ties, but rather from
the aggregation of relationships from different aspects of one's
life. 146 Friends no longer fall away because of geographic or other
circumstances; the relationship is simply reconfigured.147 It takes
significant "time and energy to maintain a large" and fragmented
network that challenges one's ability to meet expectations of
sociality from an increased number of discrete individual and
collective relationships. 148
Advancements in communications technology play a vital and
beneficial role in managing the burden of building and maintaining
these larger, more fragmented networks. 149 Cellphones and Internet
technologies enable communication at both the 'intense local' and
'extensive global' levels. 150 This allows users of these technologies
to build and maintain larger and more fragmented networks than
nonusers, with roughly the same number of core ties but a greater
number of significant ties. 51 Communication technologies also
facilitate broader access to social capital from both core and
significant ties. 152 "[P]eople not only socialize online, but they
144 BOASE ET AL., supra note 127, at 15.
145 id.
146 See id. at ii, 15.
147 See id. at 42.
1481Id. at 15.
149 Id. at ii-vi ("The number of core ties is about the same, regardless of
whether one goes online or not, [but] internet users have a slightly larger number
of significant ties than non-users.").
150 See BOASE ET AL., supra note 127, at ii-vi.
151 Id. at vi ("The number of core ties is about the same, regardless of
whether one goes online or not. However, internet users have a slightly larger
number of significant ties than non-users.").
152 Id. at vii, 15, 28, 42-43 (clarifying that the Internet permits "people [to]
use the internet to activate their social networks when they need help" and that
"[p]eople who are fairly heavy users of information and communication
technologies are also more likely than average to report high levels of receiving
help when they need it").
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[also] incorporate the internet into seeking information,
exchanging advice, and making decisions."'153 Thus, rather than
"suck[ing] people away from in-person contact, fostering
alienation and real-world disconnection,"1 54 research shows that
"the internet is enabling people to maintain existing ties, often to
strengthen them."'155 Indeed, the data is fairly clear that new
communication technologies do not replace more 'intimate'
communication, such as in-person and phone contact, but rather
supplement these more traditional forms of communication and
thus facilitate the maintenance of larger social networks.'
56
Although connection to significant ties might be the most striking
result of these new communication technologies, most of the
interaction taking place online is with core ties - the family and
friends to whom one regularly speaks either in person or over the
phone.
57
153 BOASE ET AL., supra note 127, at 42.
154 Id. at 1-2 (recognizing the "fear about what the internet is doing to
relationships is that the internet seduces people into spending time online at the
expense of time spent with friends and family" and "worries that relationships
that exist in text - or even screen-to-screen on flickering webcams - are less
satisfying than those in which people can really see, hear, smell, and touch each
other").
155 Id. at 3 (citing Jeffrey Boase & Barry Wellman, Personal Relationships:
On and Off the Internet, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS (Anita L. Vangelisti & Daniel Perlman eds., 2006); JAMES E.
KATZ & RONALD E. RICE, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNET USE: ACCESS,
INVOLVEMENT, AND INTERACTION (2002)) (illustrating "research ... showing
that the internet is not destroying relationships or causing people to be anti-
social"). "The internet does not reduce in-person or telephone contact, or any
other form of social activity; it replaces only sleeping or TV watching." Id. at
22. Furthermore, the "replacement theory" is not supported, but the opposite is
true, particularly for significant ties-"[t]he more contact by one medium, the
more contact by others." Id. at 22-23. "[T]he current generation of email users is
communicating much more often than recent generations and possibly more
often than any previous generation since people huddled in caves with only
conversation to pass the nights away." Id. at 24.
'56 See id. at 22, 30-31.
157 Id. at 3-4 ("[T]he relationships maintained through online
communication only rarely are with an entirely new set of individuals who live
far away," but rather "a large amount of the communication that takes place
online is with the same set of friends and family who are also contacted in
person and by phone.").
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Social network sites are uniquely situated to benefit from these
transformations in social organization and the communication
demands of the larger, more fragmented social networks that have
emerged. danah m. boyd and Nicole B. Ellison "define social
network sites as web-based services that allow individuals to (1)
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a
connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and
those made by others within the system."' 58 Facebook provides an
excellent example. 159 Users create public displays of connection
using various points of commonality.' 60 Existing connections
migrate from physical space to the online environment.' 61 Lost
connections are reestablished based on shared, articulated
histories. 162 New connections are established as users declare and
cross-reference their affiliations. 163 Networks grow exponentially
as they link and overlap.' 64 At each point, personal information is
the connective key.
165
To more completely understand the role of personal
information within these networks, it may be helpful to
conceptualize Facebook as a platform for social production.'
66
158 boyd & Ellison, supra note 6, at 211.
'59 1d at 210-11,213, 221.
160 See, e.g., id at 218 (discussing how Facebook users joined networks
based on which university or institution they attended).
161 See id. at 211.
162 See generally Claire Suddath, Raging Retrosexuals, TIME, Sept. 21,
2009, at 79, available at www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1921609,00.html.
See also Gardengates, How to Find Lost Friends on Facebook, EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/how_4801002_lost-friends-facebook.html (last visited
May 14, 2010) (demonstrating tips on how to reconnect with people on
Facebook).
163 See boyd & Ellison, supra note 6, at 213.
'64 See, e.g., andfaraway, http://andfaraway.net/blog/2009/11/08/25-years-
of-facebook-friends/ (Nov. 8, 2009, 23:44 EST); Brian Solis, Facebook,
MySpace and How to Avoid the Perils of 'Social Network Fatigue', Soc. J.
COMPUTING, Aug. 9, 2007, http://socialcomputingjournal.com/viewcolumn.
cfm?colid=546.
165 See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1149-51 (citations omitted).
166 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 3, 91-92, 99, 106 (2006)
(exploring the concepts of social production), available at
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Users are motivated by the provision and accumulation of social
capital, but the product is user-supplied personal information.'
67
Among users, Facebook is a " 'gift economy,' " based on sharing
rather than selling.' 68 I share my personal information with you;
you share your personal information with me. Through this
practice we create and exchange social capital. The network
provides a mechanism by which to meet the expectations of
sociality from a greater number of discrete individual and
collective relationships.' 69 Reflecting this diversity of relationship,
sociality takes many forms. Various modes of communication-
one-to-many broadcasting, personal messaging, one-to-one
communication in public space, etc.-service different forms of
relationships and discrete networks. 170  Not only are the
information and tools of distribution centralized, but so are the
tools of reception and evaluation.
The process of sociality that occurs within these networks is
driven by our need to preserve the benefits of community in a more
splintered world: remaining connected in our relationships,
creating and retaining common experience, engaging peer opinion,
http:www.benkler.org/BenklerWealth Of Networks.pdf; NICHOLAS CARR,
THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 137-40
(2008) (exploring concepts of social production); DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY
D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES
EVERYTHING 11-15, 30-31, 95-96, 153, 289-90 (2006); see also Steven A.
Hetcher, Hume's Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer
Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 994-97 (2009) (citations omitted)
(discussing Facebook as a peer production).
167 See BENKLER, supra note 166, at 361-62; Hetcher, supra note 166, at
995.
168 Hetcher, supra note 166, at 986 n.95, 995 (citing Rishab Aiyer Ghosh,
Cooking Pot Markets: An Economic Model for the Trade in Free Goods and
Services on the Internet, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2, 1998, http://firstmonday.org/
htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/580/501; Yochai Benkler,
Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 373
(2002)).
169 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1151.
170 See, e.g., id. (citations omitted) (discussing how social network users
can communicate with each other by posting comments on each others' 'Walls,'
by tagging each other in pictures and by sending messages through a private
messaging system that is not available for other people in the network to see).
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and building reputation. 17 1 Personal information is at the heart of
17217these engagements. It is how we create intimacy. 73 It is how we
maintain, strengthen, and even transform so many distinct and
diverse relationships scattered throughout a large, fragmented
network. Users must move beyond basic identifiers and contact
information, although this data is part of one's profile, to reveal
true expressions of self-for example, preferences, graphic
representations, affiliations, acts, and sexuality. 174 Thus, just as the
transformation of social organization drives us to join these
networks, so too does the primary need for community encourage
the centralization and distribution of our most personal data.
The range and depth of personal information disclosed on the
network is a product, in part, of the process of identity
performance and evaluation in a mediated environment. 175 As
Oscar Gandy observes, "individual identities are formed in
interaction with others," including group affiliation.' 76  "In
[mediated] environments, traditional identity cues, such as accent
and style of dress, are not [readily] available."'177 Even where
assertions of digital identity are linked to an individual's offline
identity, such as Facebook, users must still compensate with
reference to other cues: providing more information, increasing
171 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1152-54 (quoting Hugo Liu, Social
Network Profiles as Taste Performances, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM.
252, 262 (2008), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/voll3/issue/liu.html)
(citing Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 919, 923-24 & nn.7-8 (2005)).
"' Id. at 1154 (citing Strahilevitz, supra note 171, at 923-24 & nn.7-8).
173 Id. (citing Strahilevitz, supra note 171, at 923-24 & nn.7-8) ("Sharing
personal information is a basic component of intimacy.").
174 See id. at 1151 (citing Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0-The Principle of
Proportionality, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 869, 902-05 (2009)).
'75 Id. at 1152-53.
176 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Exploring Identity and Identification in
Cyberspace, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1085, 1088 (2000)
(citing William E. Cross, Jr., Oppositional Identity and African American Youth:
Issues and Prospects, in TOWARD A COMMON DESTINY: IMPROVING RACE AND
ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 185, 203 (Willis D. Hawley & Anthony W.
Jackson eds., 1995)).
177 Cliff Lampe et al., A Familiar Face(book): Profile Elements as Signals
in an Online Social Network, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 435, 436 (2007).
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communication time, and using networks to triangulate and
authenticate. 1
78
Cliff Lampe, Nicole B. Ellison, and Charles Steinfield provide
a useful structure for conceptualizing this link between identity and
the proliferation of personal information, describing online identity
performance in terms of the signaling theory, the common ground
theory, and the transaction cost theory. 179 The signaling theory,
positing that "conventional signals" are not inherently reliable but
are instead a matter of social convention and context, 180 helps to
explain "why Facebook profiles might be more 'honest' " and
dispersed in the information provided because one's "shared social
network can provide explicit or implicit verification of identity
claims."' 81 The common ground theory explains the motivation to
provide greater amounts of information in terms of the common
frames of reference that help to define membership in shared
communities, expanding the breadth and depth of one's
networks.1 82 The transaction cost theory bridges the gap between
signaling and common ground, suggesting that the provision of
more information "reduce[s] the cost[s] of finding the common
referents."
183
For younger users engaged in the process of identity
formation, these acts of articulation-text, images, audio, and
video-serve a distinct purpose. 184 As danah boyd describes, teens
in digital space are engaged in the practice of writing themselves
"into being." 185 This captures a process by which younger users




181 Id. at 437.
181 id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 436-37.
184 danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of
Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL
MEDIA 128-29, 131 (David Buckingham ed., 2008), available at
http://www.danah.org/papers/WhyYouthHeart.pdf [hereinafter Social Network
Sites].
'85 danah boyd, Friends, Friendsters, and MySpace Top 8: Writing
Community into Being on Social Network Sites, FIRST MONDAY, Dec.
2006, available at http://www.danah.org/papers/FriendsFriendsterTop8.pdf
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"work out identity and status, make sense of cultural cues [and
societal norms], and negotiate public life." 186 It is the process of
taking risks: putting yourself out there, pushing boundaries,
gauging reactions, and attempting to determine what is acceptable
and what is not.187 To this end, teens often maintain multiple
identities, some linked to their offline identities and others
closeted, making claims of personal information public.'
8 8
B. Phenomenon Number Two. Altering the Structure of the
Information Exchange Agreement
The second phenomenon creating new and powerful
distortions in the market for personal information is an alteration to
the basic structure of the information exchange agreement. i89 This
structure integrates two previously discussed aspects of social
network sites. First, the network is configured as a platform for
social production in which users are motivated to contribute
personal information by the provision and accumulation of social
capital. 190 This platform is, however, commercially architected and
maintained;' 9 1 a fact that, under most conditions, remains deeply in
the background as the "gift economy" of user transactions operates
in the open. 192 Every transaction in that economy is facilitated by
[hereinafter Friends] (citing JENNY SUNDtN, MATERIAL VIRTUALITIES:
APPROACHING ONLINE TEXTUAL EMBODIMENT (2003)).
186 Social Network Sites, supra note 184, at 120.
1
8 1ld. at 137.
188 See Chris J. Pelzer, Iowa State Univ, Social Networking Sites and the
Consequences of Multiple Identities Among Members of Virtual Communities 5
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/-cjpelzer/
Resarch Paper Final Draft.pdf.
189 See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1179.
'9°1d. at 1151.
191 See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in
Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1107-08, 1114 (citing Facebook,
Facebook's Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited
May 14, 2010) [hereinafter Facebook's Privacy Policy]; MySpace.com, Privacy
Policy, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy (last
visited May 14, 2010)).
192 XIAOCHANG Li, MORE THAN MONEY CAN Buy: LOCATING VALUE IN




the platform, and every detail of every transaction is captured by
the network. 193 Second, as discussed previously, the law has
embraced the proliferation of standardized, nonnegotiable
contracts in which consent is often obscured both at the time of
agreement-for example, by dramatically increasing the transaction
costs associated with reading, understanding, and renegotiating the
contract-and throughout the life of the contract. 94 The user agrees
up front to an ongoing relationship in which continuing consent is
inferred from continued use of the network. 195 The very inclusion
of the network as a party to these user-to-user transactions is
seldom if ever reconfirmed, ensuring that the broad, dictated terms
of consent retreat from the more visible terms of the information
exchange agreement. 196 A comparison between different models of
these agreements helps to illuminate these points.
In the classic e-commerce model, the consumer provides
money and a narrow universe of personal data associated with the
delivery of the purchased goods or services.' 97 In exchange, the
consumer receives the requested merchandise and perhaps
193 Catherine Dwyer et al., Trust and Privacy Concern Within Social
Networking Sites: A Comparison of Facebook and MySpace, in ASS'N FOR INFO.
Sys., 13TH AMERICAS CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2007),
available at http://csis.pace.edu/-dwyer/research/DwyerAMCIS2007.pdf
("Social networking sites record all interactions, and retain them for potential
use in social data mining.").
194 Rakoff, supra note 101, at 1182, 1191 (quoting Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981)).
195 Fred H. Cate & Michael E. Staten, Protecting Privacy in the New
Millennium: The Fallacy of "Opt-In", NAT'L RETAIL FED'N, 2000,
http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/whitepapers/fallacyofo
ptin.pdf.
196 See, e.g., Google, Google Terms of Service, at para. 4.2,
https://www.google.com/accounts/TOS?Ioc=US&hl=en (last visited May 14,
2010) [hereinafter Terms of Service] (noting that a user that agrees to the terms
of service also agrees that Google may change the form and nature of its
services without giving notice to the user).
197 See generally R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's
"Surfer Beware", 47 A.F. L. REv. 125, 126 (1999) (discussing the increase of




personalization for future purchases.' 98 Here, the merchant is a
direct and salient beneficiary of a discrete universe of information,
limited in time.' 99 The merchant can use that information, inter
alia, to populate a proprietary database, share that information with
third parties, or combine that information with information
acquired from others.2 °°
The Gmail model builds on this basic arrangement. The initial
transaction looks like the e-commerce model, with the user
providing a limited amount of personal information (less than
required by most online merchants) in exchange for e-mail
services. 20 1 Gmail then provides a platform for transactions
between individuals in the form of exchanges of information
between the user and third-party contacts, often with benefits to
social capital.20 2 Gmail recedes into the background, almost as a
third-party beneficiary of these subsequent exchanges between
203contacts. Based on the content of these exchanges, Gmail is able
198 See Pippin, supra note 197, at 126 (discussing storage of consumers'
personal information on the Internet).
9 See id. at 127-28 (citing MARTHA K. LANDESBERG & LAURA
MAZZARELLA, FED. TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10-11, 19-20 (1999), http://www.ftc.gov/ os/1999/07/
privacy99.pdf) (discussing the enormous amount of personal information that
commercial websites collect from consumers)).
200 See id. at 127-30 (discussing how websites store consumer information
and target users through online advertising).
201 Terms of Service, supra note 196, at para. 5.1; Google Accounts,
Gmail, https://mail.google.com/mail/signup (last visited May 14, 2010).
202 McGeveran, supra note 191, at 1115, 1130 (citing Miguel HeIft,
Google's Free Phone Manager Could Threaten a Variety of Services, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at B.9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/
12/technology/intemet/12google.html; Rex Crum, No End in Sight
for Microsofi-Google War, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 15, 2008,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/no-end-sight-microsoft-google-war/
story.aspx?guid=%7BA5D6279D-40A9-4AEB-9835-C003D296A841%
7D&dist=msr; Posting of Nick O'Neill to All Facebook,
http://www.allfacebook.com/2008/07/facebook-ifurthers-attack-on-friendfeed-
adds-comments-to-news-feed/ (July 31, 2008, 9:41 EST)).
203 See, e.g., Google, Gmail Privacy Notice (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (noting that the Gmail service can
retain information and contents of e-mails and allow advertisers to market goods
and services based on the contents of those e-mails).
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to gather a great deal of personal information and push out
advertisements coordinated to that data.2 °4 Gmail claims not to
pass personal data on to third parties except when required by
law.
The social network site model, in turn, builds on the Gmail
model, although the consumer initially publishes a great deal of
personal information to a profile, rather than simply providing a
limited amount of data on a one-time basis.20 6 Going forward, the
social network site provides the platform for organization,
coordination, and communication, leveraging attributes of the
social production model, for example, leveraging easy group
formation, the social urge to share, integrated tools for
contribution, the move toward "[m]ass amateurization" in the
production of user-created content, and changes in the information
filtering process from prepublishing to postpublishing.2 °7
Capitalizing on this social production phenomenon, the network is
architected to incorporate multiple points of data production and
data sensors.20 8 Users are producing information about themselves,
information about others, and information about their various
social networks.20 9 Contacts act as both data sensors and
204 See, e.g., Google, supra note 203 (noting that Gmail will retain
information in messages in order to send advertisements that are relevant to the
messages sent).
205 Id.; Google, Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/
privacypolicy.html (last visited May 14, 2010) (explaining that Google will
share limited information with third parties).
206 Compare Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1149 (citing Facebook, Help
Center: Friends, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=441 (last visited May
14, 2010); Posting of Florin Ratiu to The Facebook Blog,
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blogid=company&blogger=651632348
(May 1, 2008, 22:02 EST)), with Google, Privacy Center: Privacy FAQ,
http://www.google.com/privacyfaq.html (last visited May 14, 2010).
207 See, e.g., CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 29, 48-49, 63-66, 83-84, 87 (2008);
Lampe et al., supra note 177, at 435-36.
208 Lampe et al., supra note 177, at 435-36.
209 See, e.g., Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog,
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=-54434097130 (Feb. 16, 2009, 14:09
EST) (discussing the inherent conflict between sharing information and
restricting it to users' intended audiences).
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producers. 210 Tools for data collection, use, and publication-for
example, search access and functionality, News Feed, and Beacon-
are built into and layered on top of the network. 211 The result is an
exponentially expanding mosaic of information.
Like Gmail, the social network site has full access to the
content of these informational flows, but with the contextual
benefit of primarily authenticated identity and articulated social
networks.212 Moving beyond the Gmail model, personal
information is collected across a multitude of sources and across
extended periods of time while being aggregated, analyzed, and
shared.213 Durable and heavy usage produces a broader range and
greater depth of data.
Much like the Gmail model, the social network site itself tends
to recede into the background of this informational hum,
positioned as a veiled third-party beneficiary of discrete exchanges
between contacts and the flow of information within and across
networks. Transitions in social organization push users to the
network and necessitate ongoing participation. The single 'bargain'
of membership, standardized and nonnegotiable, is sustained
across time. 214 The network's status as a party to these social
210 See, e.g., Posting of Adam Ostrow to Mashable, http://mashable.com/
2009/12/10/facebook-privacy-experts/ (Dec. 10, 2009, 9:36 EST) (discussing
privacy experts' responses to Facebook's settings that encourage users to share
information with " 'everyone' ").
211 See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1146-48.
212 See, e.g., Facebook's Privacy Policy, supra note 191 (explaining that
Facebook has the right to retain information from transactions completed on the
network and may record any user communications).
213 See News Release, Worcester Polytechnic Inst. (WPI), Online Social
Networks Leak Personal Information to Third-Party Tracking Sites (Aug. 24,
2009), http://www.wpi.edu/news/20090/privacy.html. For a full study on
leakage of personal information, see generally BALACHANDER KRISHNAMURTHY
& CRAIG E. WILLS, WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INST., ON THE LEAKAGE OF
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION VIA ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
(2009), http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2009/workshops/wosn/papers
/p7.pdf.
214 See, e.g., Facebook, Help Center: Login and Password - Sign Up,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=173 (last visited May 14, 2010)
(signifying that once an individual signs up for Facebook and accepts the
network's e-mail confirmation, registration is complete).
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transactions is seldom if ever reconfirmed.21 5 Consent recedes
further into the background, obscured not only by the behavioral
market distortions discussed previously, but also by intense
societal pressure to maintain network connection and visibility.
216
V. CRITIQUING REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
The market distortions just described-which flow from
fundamental changes in social organization, unique characteristics
of the new mediated environments of social interaction, and
evolving legal concepts serving technical and market efficiency 217
present unique difficulties for our notice-and-choice system of
privacy protection. Social network sites are particularly
troublesome because the revelation of personal information is the
very reason users are on the site in the first place; we join
Facebook for the purpose of telling other people about our lives.
We make our personal information 'public' both voluntarily and
intentionally, and we expect others to pay attention. We also
expect others to provide additional information about us and thus
to acknowledge the social ties of association. We work hard to
develop a network identity that is deep, broad, and socially
connected, just as we envision ourselves to be.
The challenge, then, is to facilitate privacy regulation while
preserving the benefits of new social spaces that require strategic
data disclosure in order to work. By this measure, the majority of
current proposals for regulating the collection, storage, use, and
transfer of personal information are misguided,2 18 either because
they under-protect personal information by failing to adequately
address the problems of valuation and consent or because they
overprotect the information by failing to adequately preserve
functionality in socially valuable communications platforms.
Although this essay is not intended as an exhaustive critique of
privacy proposals, a few examples are instructive.
215 See Facebook, supra note 214.
216 See supra pt. III.A.
217 See supra pt. IV.






In A Taxonomy of Privacy, Daniel J. Solove acknowledges
that "[i]f a person consents to most [otherwise invasive] activities,
there is no privacy violation"-a particularly acute problem in social
network sites.219 The overwhelming legal significance of consent
and its relationship to market distortions undermines many privacy
regulation proposals.220 For instance, proposals to allocate property
rights in personal information to the data subject provide no real
answer for the market distortions that undermine the rational
economic actor and, thus, consent. Although proponents claim that
property rights would create equality in bargaining, property is
freely alienable and thus easy to transfer. Propertization may,
therefore, improve the data subject's position in the clandestine
collection of personal information but do little to limit contractual
consent. Proposals to make privacy more salient at the point of
disclosure through education and notice are more accurately
targeted at the issue of consent but have so far proven to be
ineffective. 221 Some commentators are seeking a technical solution
that attempts to automate and enhance our better judgment by
mitigating information asymmetries and psychological distortions,
nudging us towards privacy at the moment that our judgment is
most impaired, but even those involved in the development of
these technologies agree that they will likely be only marginally
beneficial. 2
Proposals to expand regulation in the area of consumer fraud
or to create a do-not-track registry are similarly flawed. 23 There is
no indication that social network sites need to engage in fraud to
attract users and collect personal information; users are adequately
219 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 484-
85 (2006).
220 See generally Joel Winston, FTC Staff Report: Behavioral Advertising
Tracking, Targeting, & Technology, 970 PRACTISING L. INST. 411 (2009)
(summarizing and analyzing public comments to the FTC concerning online
privacy regulation for behavioral advertising).
221 See generally id
222 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1184-87 (quoting Social Network Sites,
supra note 184, at 132) (discussing the ineffectiveness of technical controls).
223 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, 'Do Not Track' Registry Proposedfor Web
Use; Online Behavior Used to Tailor Ads, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2007, at D. 1.
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motivated to join and disclose as it is. 224 Likewise, a do-not-track
registry would have little effect on those many users seeking the
benefits of a social network site. Finally, proposals to expand
liability, sounding in common law tort, may have some
applicability to specific bad acts of publication and/or collection,
but those proposals are largely trumped by the type of contractual
consent provided by social network site users.225
B. Overprotection
Because of the market distortions present in a social network
site and the effect of those distortions on the act of consent, some
226have sought to impose strict restrictions. One such proposal is
the imposition of an opt-in system, in which data subjects must
affirmatively choose to disclose information by opting in to the
collection. 227 At some level, however, this is precisely the systemcurrently followed by social network sites. 228 Users opt in to the
224 Rory Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook
and Utopian Civil Justice, 79 Miss. L.J. 317, 347-48 (2009) (quoting Ralph
Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online
Social Networks (The Facebook Case), 4 WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY ELECTRONIC
Soc'Y §§ 1, 3.3 (2005), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-acquisti/papers/privacy-
facebook-gross-acquisti.pdf).
225 Sander J.C. van der Heide, Note, Social Networking and Sexual
Predators: The Case for Self-Regulation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 173,
179-83 (2008).
226 See, e.g., Press Release, NetChoice, Misguided Marketing Restriction
and Online Travel Tax Top List of Worst Internet Legislation (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.netchoice.org/press/misguided-marketing-restriction-and-online-
travel-tax-top-list-of-worst-internet-legislation/; see also Thomas Cheplick,
Illinois Social Networking Bill Targets Minors, INFOTECH & TELECOM NEWS,
June 1, 2009, available at http://www.heartland.org/infotech-news.org/
article/25325/IllinoisSocialNetworkingBillTargetsMinors.html.
227 Marshall Lager, Social Networking: Getting in Touch the CRM Way,
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MGMT., Mar. 2006, at 20, 22, 25, available at
http://www.destinationcrm.com/Articles/Editorial/Magazine-Features/Social-
Networking-Getting-in-Touch-the-CRM-Way-42899.aspx.
228 Bruce L. Mann, Social Networking Websites - A Concatenation of
Impersonation, Denigration, Sexual Aggressive Solicitation, Cyber-Bullying or
Happy Slapping Videos, 17 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 252, 256 (2009); Jon Hood,
Facebook Turns Off Beacon: System Assailed by Privacy Advocates Is
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service and affirmatively agree to the terms for data collection,
storage, use, and transfer.229 A more restrictive iteration of this
approach would require a default setting in which no data is
collected or used to facilitate the service but, instead, the default
would mandate users to opt in to change these settings. 230 This
approach, apart from its rather paternalistic overtones, has the
potential to cripple the service either functionally or
economically. 231 Personal data provides the means for establishing
and expanding one's network. It is at the heart of the social
transactions that occur on the network. Would any active user of a
social network site actually fail to opt in if failing to do so
significantly impacted the functionality of that site? It is quite
plausible to envision privacy improvements at the margins, but at
what cost? Moreover, the long-term economic viability of social
network sites is premised on the sites' ability to monetize the user
base through targeted advertising that requires individualized
data.232 Draconian opt-in requirements might lethally undermine
that ability.
VI. CONCEPTUALIZING A SOLUTION
A full discussion of appropriate regulatory design is beyond
the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to lay down
a few conceptual markers. Most importantly, designing appropriate
privacy regulation in social network environments requires moving
beyond the private/public binary by delinking (1) the act of
intentionally disclosing personal information in and to a mediated
network environment from (2) the presumption that intentional
disclosure indicates voluntary waiver of nearly all privacy
expectations in that information-even where the user has
Casualty of Class Action, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 19, 2009,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2009/09/facebookbeacon.html.
229 Cate & Staten, supra note 195.
230 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1184-87.
231 ld.; see Cate & Staten, supra note 195.
232 Yasamine Hashemi, Note, Facebook's Privacy Policy and Its Third-
Party Partnerships: Lucrativity and Liability, 15 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 140,
148 (2009); Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security, 987
PRACTISING L. INST. 15, 22-23 (2009).
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manifested consent via contractual agreement to the contrary. Once
the act of disclosure and the express terms of consent are no longer
entirely dispositive of privacy expectations, the troubling
implications of the new and powerful market distortions associated
with social network sites become less onerous. This is not to say,
however, that individual consent should be replaced with pervasive
public regulation or intense judicial scrutiny. Nor is this to suggest
that we should rely on the existing model of the targeted but
exacting regulation of certain types of 'intimate' information or
233vulnerable users, although many of these existing limitations
might well stay in place. Instead, the regulatory power should be
used sparingly at the margins to establish, based on reasonable user
expectations, expansive boundaries for the permissible collection,
storage, use, and transfer of personal information, leaving ample
room for the development of social norms and negotiated
expectations for disclosure and consent.
By way of example, regulators might well be guided by
emerging norms of 'network' privacy expectations.234 In this
model, we distinguish between data collection and storage, data
flow within networks, and data flow between networks. Data
collection and storage by social network sites would be fairly
unregulated, although subject to existing notice and consent
requirements and, thus, open to broad negotiation. Here,
restrictions on the postcollection storage of individually
identifiable information, such as reflecting reasonable user
expectations as to data security and data expiration periods, might
be desirable. A similar, minimally regulated market approach
might be appropriate for data flowing within networks. Here,
limited regulation aimed at enabling network definition and
maintenance could provide the appropriate structure for market
development, function, and enforcement in the context of which
norms of individual control would be more likely to emerge. Data
flow between networks might well require more robust regulation,
233 Winston, supra note 220, at 431-32.
234 See generally Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy
Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2001) (discussing privacy




integrating various tools of control with targeted legal restrictions.
On the technology side, this could include user control over
network partitions, data tagging, and the addition of persistent
contextual data, just to name a few possibilities. These
technological solutions could then be paired with legal restrictions
on network crossing, downstream use, and data transfer, as well as
a requirement of data portability aimed at creating greater
competition in the market for favorable privacy terms.
Regardless of the precise approach, the key is to recognize that
rights-based, regulatory, technical, and educational proposals
aimed at 'fixing' our notice-and-choice system of privacy
protection are almost certain to fail. 235 This system is premised on
acts of disclosure and consent, and in the age of social network
sites, the market distortions previously described are simply too
powerful and distortive to effectively regulate without destroying
the very functionality of these new social spaces.236 We must
instead look for meaningful ways to capture and enforce user
expectations as to the collection, storage, use, and transfer of
personal information, but only at the margins, leaving significant
room for the negotiation of social norms around privacy practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Social network sites alter the conditions of the privacy
paradox by creating new and powerful market distortions.
Transformations in social organization are driving individuals to
join, participate, and remain in these networks as a way to maintain
relationships and to build community. 237 It is through the
disclosure and exchange of personal information over the network
that users construct groups and create intimacy. As individuals
engage in our communities through identity performance,
computer-mediated environments require us to compensate for the
lack of traditional identity clues by increasing our time on the
network and providing a greater amount of personal
235 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1178-87.
236 See supra pt. IV.
237 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1151-60.
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information. 238 For younger users engaged in identity formation,
navigating this new public space is particularly challenging.239
Social network sites serve as the platform for these social
transactions and the exchange of information on which they are
based. Yet these platforms have fundamentally altered the more
familiar structure of an information exchange agreement. Rather
than receiving a discrete set of information tied to the necessities
of a specific transaction, social network sites cultivate a continuous
relationship in which whatever minimal amount of negotiation and
consent exists attendant to that transaction is front-loaded. This
single 'bargain' is then maintained over time, receding into the
background as millions of user-to-user transactions flow through
the architecture. The social network site facilitates and encourages
those transactions, profiting as a third-party beneficiary of the
information generated by those social bargains.
Our notice-and-choice system of privacy protection is ill-
equipped to deal with the market distortions just described,
particularly in the context of social spaces devoted to large,
inclusive networks and the open exchange of personal information.
The majority of current proposals for regulating privacy in these
environments are imprudent because they either fail to adequately
address the problems of valuation and consent (under-protection)
or fail to adequately preserve functionality (overprotection).
Instead of attempting to fix our notice-and-choice system of
privacy protection-a fool's errand in an environment seeped in new
and powerful market distortions of consent-the better approach is
to be guided by user expectations as to the outer limits of
permissible data collection, storage, use, and transfer. These
expectations would be expressed in minimal regulatory restraints at
the margins of these practices, leaving significant room for markets
in the development of social norms around privacy practices.
238 See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1151-60.
23 9See id. at 1152-53.
932 [Vol. 19
